Layer 1 blockchain
Secret Network ticker SCRT
Summary
Proof-of-stake Cosmos SDK chain (secret-4) using CometBFT consensus; a public node reported application version 1.27.2 on CometBFT 0.38.22 on 2026-09-27. SCRT holders delegate to validators; unbonding takes 21 days and double-signing is slashed 5%. A block commits once validators holding more than 2/3 of voting power precommit it. Execution runs in hardware enclaves: every consensus node runs the contract engine inside an Intel SGX enclave that has passed remote attestation and holds the network's shared encryption seed, so contract inputs, outputs and state stay encrypted to the node operator. That confidentiality rests on the hardware enclave, not on cryptography alone. 123422232628
Design
- System
- Layer 1 blockchainSecret Network is its own Cosmos SDK proof-of-stake chain (chain ID secret-4), so it stays a layer 1. Two caveats: since the 2025 hardware-enclave attack disclosures, new nodes join only from a governance-approved hardware allowlist or from Microsoft Azure, which the project itself calls semi-permissioned; and a July 2026 proposal to move SCRT to Arbitrum as an ERC-20 was rejected on-chain, after which governance approved continuing the existing chain under community stewardship.
- Settlement family
- Cosmos SDK
- Scarce resource
- Stake (proof of stake)
- State model
- Accounts
- Finality
- Economic finality
- Who makes blocks
- Validators take turns proposing in proportion to voting power. The staking module allows up to 80, but only 23 were bonded on 2026-09-27; the largest held about a quarter of bonded stake and the top three together held more than a third. A new validator machine must pass enclave attestation and be on a hardware allowlist approved by governance, unless it runs in Microsoft Azure.
- Fork choice
- No fork choice in the Nakamoto sense: each height is decided by more than 2/3 of voting power precommitting (the Tendermint BFT consensus Secret's docs describe). Conflicting commits would require at least a third of voting power to double-sign, which is attributable and slashable. If more than a third of voting power is offline the chain stops instead of forking; block headers show a 40-minute gap between heights 26,644,169 and 26,644,170 on 12 August 2026.
Qualifications
- Permissionless node admission · Partial. Anyone can hold, send and stake SCRT, but since releases 1.22 and 1.23 a new node's hardware ID must be on an allowlist, except for Azure machines. The docs recommend adding machines by governance vote; the alternative is asking the developers to include a machine in the next release. Release 1.25 added support for Proof of Cloud machines, which the docs still call a future route. The docs describe this as a move from fully permissionless to semi-permissioned after the 2025 enclave attacks; some older pages still describe open joining.
- Confidentiality trust model · Contested. Encrypted contract state is only as private as Intel SGX. Researchers extracted the consensus seed through an SGX flaw in 2022 (making data encrypted with that seed decryptable), and the 2025 WireTap and TEE.fail papers showed physical memory-bus attacks recovering the seed (WireTap on the test network; TEE.fail does not say which network). The project responded with seed rotation in 2023 and machine allowlisting in 2025; rotation does not re-protect data encrypted under earlier seeds.
- Ibc · Applies. IBC connects Secret to other Cosmos chains through on-chain light clients and relayers. Connected chains are separate chains, not layer 2s; IBC is recorded under bridges.
- Core development stewardship · Contested. SCRT Labs, the original core developer, said it would end its development and support of the chain on 2026-09-01 whatever the vote. Its proposal to migrate SCRT to Arbitrum was rejected (proposal 360); a Foundation-led continuance with a large new token mint passed (proposal 365), and the upgrades since August 2026 ship from a community repository. SCRT Labs has publicly called some of the continuance campaign's claims about it false or misleading.
- New contract deployment · Partial. Since governance proposal 370 (passed 2026-09-05) uploading new contract code and creating new contract instances are switched off by a circuit breaker; existing contracts and IBC transfers keep running. The on-chain disabled list still showed both message types on 2026-09-27.
Tradeoffs
- Emphasizes
- Security
- Gives up
- Decentralization and throughput. Consensus nodes need server-class Intel SGX hardware on an allowlist (or Azure), only 23 validators were bonded on 2026-09-27, and three of them held more than a third of stake. Running contracts inside the enclave costs throughput: the project's own docs estimate the enclave and encryption overhead at roughly 30% over an ordinary contract engine and say the enclave-compatible engine it uses is much slower than the standard one. Confidentiality additionally depends on trusting Intel SGX.Security here means BFT consensus safety with slashing and single-block commits; it is weakened in practice by the stake concentration above. Privacy is a separate property, not one of the three corners: it rests on hardware enclaves, and researchers extracted the network's master decryption seed through SGX flaws in 2022 and demonstrated further extraction attacks in 2025.
- Full node at home
- Demanding 45678202731The docs list at least 32 GB RAM (64 GB recommended), 512 GB to 1 TB SSD and an Intel server CPU with SGX; AMD is unsupported, and release 1.24 blocked all desktop CPUs and the Xeon E-21xx/E-22xx lines. Every full node runs the enclave, so a new machine outside Azure must be added to the allowlist by governance vote (minimum deposit 5,000 SCRT since 23 September 2026) or in a later software release. A beta non-SGX node (1.25) runs on ordinary hardware but copies contract results from a paired SGX node.
- Throughput claims
- Theoretical peak: 10 tx/s 924Theoretical peak; not comparable across chains or with observed load.Secret contract executions per second, derived from block limits rather than measured.Assumes a 6 million gas block limit, about 100,000 gas per contract call and roughly 6-second blocks, as stated on the undated docs page. The live block gas limit read on 2026-09-27 was 5 million.Arithmetic from block parameters in the documentation, not an observed measurement. The current 5 million gas block limit is lower than the figure used on the docs page, which would lower the result. Ignores propagation, state growth, enclave query load and the encryption overhead the same page describes.
- Unclassified: 25 tx/s 9Unclassified; do not compare.Mixed contract and simple transfer or staking messages, as described on the docs page.The docs describe this as an in-practice figure but give no measurement window, method or date. Depends on the message mix; simple transfers use far less gas than contract calls. Not comparable with figures published for other chains.
Scaling layers
No scaling layer recorded in this profile.
Capabilities
| Capability | How it is provided | Notes and sources |
|---|---|---|
| Account abstraction | Structured assessment pending | Not yet assessed for any chain. |
| Atomic swaps | Unknown | Not yet assessed under the current definitions; no hash-time-locked or other cross-party swap mechanism was verified. IBC hooks let an incoming token transfer trigger a contract call such as a swap on arrival, but that is an automated contract action, not a swap between two parties. 11 |
| Authenticated data publication | Unknown | Not yet assessed under this row's current definition. |
| Light clients | Built into the protocolLimited scope | CometBFT consensus produces the validator-signed commits that IBC light clients check, and Secret verifies counterparty chains with on-chain light clients. Limit: clients that lapse need governance recovery, which has happened repeatedly in 2025 and 2026. The beta non-SGX node is not a light client: it trusts an SGX provider node for contract results. 71027 |
| Native staking or delegation | Structured assessment pending | Not yet assessed for any chain. |
| On-chain governance | Structured assessment pending | Not yet assessed for any chain. |
| Parallel execution | Structured assessment pending | Not yet assessed for any chain. |
| Payment or state channels | Unknown | No payment or state channel layer anchored to Secret was found. IBC channels are messaging paths, not payment channels. 10 |
| Programmable spending | Partial (layer not stated) Earlier definition | Secret Contracts are a modified CosmWasm (Rust compiled to WebAssembly) whose inputs, outputs and state are encrypted, with viewing keys or signed permits controlling who can read balances. Since 2026-09-05 a governance circuit breaker has switched off new code uploads and new contract instances, so users cannot set up new contract-based spending rules; existing contracts still execute. Lifting the pause would allow new uploads and instances again. 117182527 |
| Protocol-verified messaging | Structured assessment pending | Not yet assessed for any chain. |
| Reversible transfers or recovery | Unknown | Not yet assessed under this row's current definition. |
| Rollups | Unknown | The review did not verify absence, so the rule that absence needs a source makes this unknown rather than not present. Earlier finding: no rollup settling to Secret was found. IBC-connected chains are separate sovereign chains, not rollups. 10 |
| Shielded transfers | Structured assessment pending | Not yet assessed for any chain. |
| Signed partial offers | Unknown | Not yet assessed under this row's current definition. |
Reading these values
- How this feature is provided
- Built into the protocol, core-team software or independent software says where a feature lives and who can change it. These are implementation layers, not quality: core-team software is not closer to the protocol than independent software.
- Structured assessment pending
- The shared review has not assessed this feature for any chain yet (Account abstraction, Native staking or delegation, On-chain governance, Parallel execution, Protocol-verified messaging and Shielded transfers). That does not mean it is absent, and a chain’s profile may already describe it.
- Unknown
- The review has not established this for this chain under the current definition; the note beside it says why. Unknown is not absent and not a low score. A feature reads “Not present” only when a source shows it is absent.
- Earlier definition
- Payment or state channels, Programmable spending and Rollups keep the earlier definition until the next fact-check. There, “Native” does not separate the protocol from core-team software, “Ecosystem software” does not say who publishes it, and “Partial” does not say which layer.
- Reading across rows
- The list of capabilities is incomplete. Do not read these rows as a chain leading or lagging overall.
Ecosystem & custody
| Product type | Status | Notes and sources |
|---|---|---|
| Automated market makers | ThinShadeSwap (Shade Protocol) | ShadeSwap is a contract-based exchange on Secret whose trades run inside encrypted contracts. The docs' applications page, last updated about two years before this review, also lists Sienna and Button Swap, whose current status was not verified. Depth was not measured; SCRT Labs' July 2026 announcement said liquidity had thinned, and an August 2026 forum proposal described total network fee revenue as too small to matter for the network's finances. 16303240 |
| Issuer-native stablecoins | ThinSILK (Shade Protocol) | SILK is issued on Secret by Shade Protocol against over-collateralized crypto deposits and is pegged to a basket (US dollar, euro, yen, Canadian dollar, gold and bitcoin), not to the dollar alone. Circle does not list native USDC on Secret; USDC arrives from Noble over IBC. Axelar-bridged stablecoins were among the tokens forged in the June 2026 exploit. 293839 |
| Algorithmic stablecoins | Unknown | SILK describes itself as reflexive, but its docs describe collateral-backed minting, so it is listed with native stablecoins. Other algorithmic or hybrid stablecoins on Secret were not reviewed. 39 |
| Bridges | Native to the protocolIBC (Cosmos chains, including Noble), Axelar (paused since June 2026), SecretPath gateway (EVM messaging) | IBC transfers connect Secret to other Cosmos chains and can wrap arriving tokens as private SNIP-20 tokens in one step. The docs also list Axelar for EVM assets, Gravity Bridge and the SecretPath messaging gateway, with Wormhole and Union marked as coming soon; the applications page marks a Monero bridge as not working. Risk: In June 2026 an attacker opened an IBC channel from a counterfeit chain to Secret's Axelar bridge contract, minted about 4.67 million US dollars of unbacked tokens and redeemed them for real reserves; the Axelar route was paused and compensation had not been verified as delivered at review. IBC safety also depends on each counterparty's consensus and on light clients being kept current; several lapsed clients needed governance recovery in 2025 and 2026. 101112162729 |
| Block explorers | Established in the ecosystemMintscan, Ping.pub, ATOMScan, Zonescan, EZ Staking, Secret Dashboard (analytics) | The Secret docs and the Cosmos chain registry list these explorers and several more. The Secret Network homepage said on 2026-09-27 that Mintscan is being retired and pointed users to Zonescan. Most pages are rendered in the browser and were not confirmed to show live Secret data. Explorers only see public data: encrypted contract inputs and SNIP-20 amounts are not readable. 131921 |
| Hardware wallets | ThinLedger (Secret module behind a switch that is off by default; third-party software per Secret's guides) | See custody rows: Ledger Wallet's code includes Secret Network behind a switch that is off by default, and Secret's docs show Ledger devices signing through the Ping.pub web wallet or the command-line client with the Secret or Cosmos device app. Trezor states it does not support Secret. 143637 |
Hardware-wallet custody
| Device maker | Status | What users can and cannot do |
|---|---|---|
| Ledger | PartialSame as native: Unknown | Can: Keep SCRT keys on a Ledger Nano S, S Plus or X and send through the Ping.pub web wallet, confirming each transaction on the device, per Secret's guide Can: Delegate, withdraw rewards and vote through SecretCLI with the device Can: Wrap SCRT and send SNIP-20 tokens through SecretCLI with the device Cannot: Count on Secret appearing in Ledger Wallet: its Secret Network module sits behind a feature switch that is off by default, and no Ledger page confirming it is on was found Cannot: Always find the Secret device app without enabling experimental apps, according to the Secret guideLedger Wallet's code includes a Secret Network module but hides it unless a remotely controlled switch is turned on, and that production setting could not be read. The signing routes recorded here come from Secret's own guides, which use the Ping.pub web wallet or SecretCLI with the Secret or Cosmos device app and name older devices and the Ledger Live app. 141536 |
| Trezor | None foundSame as native: No | Cannot: Manage SCRT in Trezor Suite Cannot: Treat SCRT token copies on other networks as Secret Network custodyTrezor's page states that it does not support Secret; third-party signing paths with Trezor were not checked. 37 |
Public data
iKnow Blockchain has no public-data lookups for Secret Network yet. This is a limit of the service, not a statement about the network.
| Lookup | Status | What it covers and its limits |
|---|---|---|
| Address or account | Not available yet | Public-data lookups for this chain are not built yet. |
| Tokens and assets | Not available yet | Public-data lookups for this chain are not built yet. |
| NFTs | Not available yet | Public-data lookups for this chain are not built yet. |
| Transactions | Not available yet | Public-data lookups for this chain are not built yet. |
Sourced developments
Developments: Review overdue Reviewed Sep 27, 2026; next review was due Oct 7, 2026, 12:00 UTC.
Publication date · newest first
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Governance paused uploading and creating new contracts
Proposal 370 used the chain's circuit breaker to switch off uploading new contract code and creating new contract instances, citing a CosmWasm security disclosure. Existing contracts, IBC transfers and wrapping of existing tokens keep working. The switch can be reversed by a later governance action.
- Proposal:passed on chain
- Implementation:circuit breaker active
- Release:no software release required
- Activation:in effect at review; no end date set
Sources: Secret Network governance (public REST endpoint) — Proposal 370: Pause new contract uploads and instantiations (external site) · Lavender.Five Nodes public endpoint — Circuit breaker disabled messages (public REST endpoint) (external site)
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Community continuance proposal passed, minting new SCRT to fund the chain
Proposal 365 passed on 19 August 2026, scheduling the 1.26.0 community continuance upgrade at height 26,790,327. The plan keeps the existing chain, creates a new stewardship entity, and funds it, core development, validators, relayers, builders and bridge exploit victims with a large new mint and a fixed 5% inflation rate. The upgrade was later applied at that height.
- Proposal:passed on chain
- Implementation:upgrade released from the community repository
- Release:v1.26.0-community-continuance published 2026-08-20
- Activation:applied at height 26,790,327
Sources: Secret Network governance (public REST endpoint) — Proposal 365: Community Continuance of Secret Network (L1) (external site) · Lavender.Five Nodes public endpoint — Applied upgrade plan v1.26.0-community-continuance (public REST endpoint) (external site) · Secret3dev on GitHub — v1.26.0-community-continuance release (external site) · Secret Network Forum (Secret Network Foundation post) — Secret^3: Community Continuance of Secret Network L1 (external site) · Lavender.Five Nodes public endpoint — Total uscrt supply (public REST endpoint) (external site) · Lavender.Five Nodes public endpoint — Current inflation (public REST endpoint) (external site)
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Holders rejected SCRT Labs' proposal to migrate SCRT to Arbitrum
SCRT Labs proposed migrating SCRT to a new ERC-20 token on Arbitrum, claimable one-for-one from a 1 September snapshot, and said it would end support for the existing chain on that date either way. Signaling proposal 360 was rejected when voting closed on 28 July 2026; a Foundation counter-proposal (361) voted the same day was also rejected.
- Proposal:rejected on chain
- Implementation:not implemented
- Release:not applicable
- Activation:no migration activated
Sources: Secret Network governance (public REST endpoint) — Proposal 360: Migrate $SCRT to Arbitrum via Snapshot (external site) · Secret Network governance (public REST endpoint) — Proposal 361: Continue Secret Network on Cosmos under community stewardship (external site) · Secret Network Forum (SCRT Labs post) — $SCRT is Moving to Arbitrum (external site) · Secret Network Forum (SCRT Labs post) — Signaling Proposal: Migrate $SCRT to Arbitrum via Snapshot (external site) · Secret Network Forum (Secret Network Foundation post) — Signaling Proposal: Continue SCRT under community with remediation (external site) · Secret Network Forum (Secret Network Foundation draft, with an SCRT Labs reply) — Community Continuance of Secret Network (L1) (external site)
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Core team reported the June 10 Axelar bridge contract exploit
SCRT Labs reported that on 10 June 2026 an attacker exploited the Secret-side contract for the Axelar bridge, minting roughly 4.67 million US dollars of unbacked bridged tokens from a counterfeit chain and redeeming them for real reserves on the Axelar side. Bridging through Axelar was disabled and the connection paused.
- Implementation:bridge route disabled and connection paused
- Release:incident report published
- Activation:remediation pending at review
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Release 1.25.0 added beta non-SGX nodes and machine ID replacement
SCRT Labs published node software 1.25.0, the newest release in its original repository. The notes list four additions: operators can replace a node's machine ID by sending a dedicated transaction; nodes can run in beta on hardware without Intel SGX if paired with an existing SGX node; the emergency validator list is updated; and machines validated through Proof of Cloud are supported. The next day the team said on-chain proposal 354 had been submitted to upgrade mainnet to 1.25.
- Proposal:proposal 354 submitted (forum notice 2026-06-11); outcome not read in this pass
- Implementation:features shipped in node release 1.25.0; non-SGX support marked beta
- Release:published 2026-06-10 in the scrtlabs repository
- Activation:not confirmed in this pass; no chain endpoint was read
Sources: scrtlabs/SecretNetwork maintainers — SecretNetwork v1.25.0 release notes (external site) · Secret Network Forum (SCRT Labs post) — Mainnet Upgrade to 1.25 (external site) · scrtlabs/SecretNetwork maintainers (GitHub) — scrtlabs/SecretNetwork release feed (Atom) (external site) · Secret3dev on GitHub — Secret3dev/SecretNetwork releases (external site)
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Release 1.24.1 blocked end-of-life machines and removed the MRSIGNER requirement
SCRT Labs published node software 1.24.1 with mainnet install steps. Its notes list four changes: machines with Intel Xeon E-22xx and other end-of-life processors may no longer join the network; Cron is enabled; one governance proposal can add several machines; and the MRSIGNER requirement is removed. The next day the team said on-chain proposal 346 had been submitted to upgrade mainnet to this version. The same change list first appeared in 1.24.0, a pre-release with test-network steps, on 2 February 2026.
- Proposal:proposal 346 submitted (forum notice 2026-03-31); outcome not read in this pass
- Implementation:changes shipped in node release 1.24.1 after the 1.24.0 test-network pre-release
- Release:published 2026-03-30 in the scrtlabs repository
- Activation:not confirmed in this pass; no chain endpoint was read
Sources: scrtlabs/SecretNetwork maintainers — SecretNetwork v1.24.1 release notes (external site) · Secret Network Forum (SCRT Labs post) — Mainnet Upgrade to 1.24.1 (external site) · scrtlabs/SecretNetwork maintainers — SecretNetwork v1.24.0 pre-release notes (external site) · Secret Network Forum (SCRT Labs post) — CPUs blocked in upcoming 1.24 release of Secret Network (external site) · Secret Network Forum (SCRT Labs post) — Upcoming Network Upgrades: EOL Machine Retirement and Easing Permissions to Join (external site)
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Emergency node release 1.23.3 patched a CometBFT vulnerability
SCRT Labs published node software 1.23.3 as an emergency release with a fix for a vulnerability in CometBFT, the consensus engine Secret shares with other Cosmos chains. Two days later the team said on the forum that an expedited on-chain proposal (340) had been submitted to move mainnet to this version, and that the flaw affected several Cosmos chains rather than Secret alone. Neither the release notes nor the forum notice name the vulnerability.
- Proposal:expedited proposal 340 submitted (forum notice 2026-01-19); outcome not read in this pass
- Implementation:fix included in node release 1.23.3
- Release:published 2026-01-17 in the scrtlabs repository
- Activation:not confirmed in this pass; no chain endpoint was read
Sources: scrtlabs/SecretNetwork maintainers — SecretNetwork v1.23.3 release notes (external site) · Secret Network Forum (SCRT Labs post) — Expedited Upgrade to 1.23.3 (external site)
Topics your AI can explain
Your AI can explain these topics for Secret Network through the connection, with sources.
Known gaps
What this profile's review did not establish:
- Bonded validator count and stake shares are a single reading on 2026-09-27; they change with delegations and machine approvals.
- Whether the main network's encryption seed was rotated after the 2025 WireTap and TEE.fail disclosures was not verified; the docs describe rotation only in the 2023 upgrade, and the research pages do not say whether the main network's seed was taken.
- The code changes in the community releases 1.26.0 and 1.27.2 were not reviewed; their release notes cover installation only, and no audit report was found.
- The cause of the 40-minute block gap on 12 August 2026 rests on a forum post saying the largest validator went offline; only the gap itself was checked in block headers.
- Ledger Wallet's code includes a Secret Network module behind a switch that is off by default; its production setting could not be read and no Ledger page confirming it was found.
- ShadeSwap liquidity, SILK supply and collateral health after the June 2026 bridge exploit were not measured, and the status of older exchanges listed in the docs was not checked.
- Remediation for bridge exploit victims was promised in the continuance proposal but its delivery was not verified.
- The reason given for pausing new contract deployments (a CosmWasm security disclosure) was not independently verified, and no end date was set.
- The throughput figures come from an undated docs page; no measurement over a stated time window was found.
- No payment channel, state channel or rollup anchored to Secret was found.
- Most explorer pages render in the browser and were not confirmed to display current Secret data.
- Adoption by validators of the higher minimum gas prices approved in signaling proposal 376 was not checked; gas prices are set per validator.
- Whether SCRT Labs issued any SCRT token on Arbitrum after its migration vote was rejected was not verified; no such announcement was found on the forum or the Secret blog, and web search was unavailable.
- Whether the Xeon E-23xx line is still admitted was not confirmed: the compliance page warns it may be excluded, while the 1.24 notice named only the E-21xx and E-22xx lines.
- Several docs pages used here (the Ledger command-line guide and the applications list) were last updated about two years before this review.
Sources
Oldest dated source check: Source checked Sep 27, 2026 Next check due Oct 27, 2026.
- Private transactions - A quick summary (external site)
- Tendermint (external site)
- How Secret Network Uses SGX (external site)
- Semi-Permissioned Model (external site)
- Adding Nodes via Governance Proposal (external site)
- Hardware setup (external site)
- Non-SGX Node (Beta) (external site)
- Hardware Compliance (external site)
- TPS and scalability (external site)
- IBC (external site)
- IBC (Hooks, PFM, Wasm) (external site)
- Bridge (messaging/tokens) (external site)
- Explorers & tools (external site)
- Use Ledger hardware wallet (external site)
- Ledger with SecretCLI (external site)
- Applications (external site)
- CosmWasm vs Secret CosmWasm (external site)
- Permits (external site)
- Secret Network homepage (external site)
- Secret Network governance deposit parameters (public REST endpoint) (external site)
- Secret Network chain registry record (external site)
- Secret Network staking parameters (public REST endpoint) (external site)
- Secret Network bonded validators (public REST endpoint) (external site)
- Secret Network consensus parameters (public REST endpoint) (external site)
- Secret Network circuit breaker disabled message list (public REST endpoint) (external site)
- Secret Network node information (public REST endpoint) (external site)
- Secret Network governance proposals, latest 40 (public REST endpoint) (external site)
- Secret Network block 26,644,170 header (public REST endpoint) (external site)
- Security Incident: Axelar<>Secret IBC Bridge Exploit (June 10, 2026) (external site)
- $SCRT is Moving to Arbitrum (external site)
- CPUs blocked in upcoming 1.24 release of Secret Network (external site)
- Proposal: Increase Secret Network Minimum Gas Fees (external site)
- SGX.Fail (external site)
- WireTap: Breaking Server SGX via DRAM Bus Interposition (external site)
- TEE.fail (external site)
- Ledger Wallet feature switch for Secret Network (currencySecretNetwork), declared without a value and therefore off by default (external site)
- Secret (SCRT) support (external site)
- USDC contract addresses (external site)
- SILK (external site)
- ShadeSwap (external site)
Report an error
Found something wrong or out of date? Reporting is free, and every chain goes through the same process. Published corrections appear in the public log.
Funding disclosure
Funding disclosures appear here when an upkeep arrangement exists, in the form “Upkeep funded by [name]; verdicts unaffected.” The funder ledger has not been published yet. Neutrality & funding